The industry of unmanned military devices. Part IV, Ukraine, escalation.

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The conflict in Ukraine escalated into a full-scale war following the failure of the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul in May 2022.

By the late autumn of 2022, the Western-Ukrainian air defence had mostly cleaned out the Ukrainian sky of the Russian aviation and missiles, besides the tactical kinds.
However, the Russian army needed the capabilities for the long-range precision strikes in operational depth. The Russian military doctrine requires them, and the situation of the increasing Western weapon supply to Ukraine calls for striking the arms caravans. It was a strategic challenge that Russia could not take on with its pool of weapons despite the large industrial facilities and aerial technologies that it possesses. Usage of the Shaheds became a revelation.
The Russians started to use them for pinpointed long-range strikes but soon realised their operational prospects. The Iranian approach skyrocketed when it demonstrated its abil-ity to exhaust expensive air defences of the Soviet and American patterns in late 2022. The Russians immediately moved to adopt the Shahed construction and upscale their production using the spare parts and technologies that remained from Soviet times. Russia is producing thousands of the Shahed-type drones monthly. The combination of the Shahed loitering munition and cruise missiles turned out to be extremely efficient in destroying the rear of the Ukrainian army.
Is it sufficiently effective to become a strategic leverage? It is a conclusion that only the outcome of the war can dictate. The strategic examples in my course of military strategy train the strategic skills by rearward perspective from results to making and execution.

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