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Application 2 - Non-credible threat, Nash Equilibrium and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Автор: Thomas Lloyd
Загружено: 2023-06-26
Просмотров: 531
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Keywords: Nash equilibrium. Entry deterrence game. Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. Non-credible threat. Microeconomics. Game theory. Micro theory. Rational agent.
In this video, we solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE) and the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE or SPNE) of the standard entry-deterrance game (with an entrant and an incumbent) using backward induction showing that the NE with a non-credible threat is not a sequentially rational equilibrium.
Thumbnail credit: Tim Mossholder on Unsplash
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