Vividly Imagining Others' Experiences Influences Moral Judgements of Their Actions

Jerry Richardson, psychology, Cornell University

Talk Title (abstract below): "Vividly Imagining Others' Experiences Influences Moral Judgements of Their Actions"

This presentation is part of the Moral Psychology Research Group 2024 conference on Penn State's University Park Campus in November 2024.

Hosted by the Consortium on Moral Decision-Making and Daryl Cameron, associate professor of psychology, Penn State, and senior research associate in tthe Rock Ethics Institute.

Sponsored by:

Penn State College of the Liberal Arts
Penn State Rock Ethics Institute
Penn State Social Science Research Institute
The McCourtney Institute for Democracy
Penn State Department of Philosophy
Penn State Department of Psychology
Penn State University Libraries

ABSTRACT: "Humans represent the thoughts and feelings of others to better empathize
with, understand, or predict their behavior. These processes could involve a
fleeting thought about what a friend or colleague might be experiencing, or
they could involve a more vivid conception of another person’s
experiences—which may have consequences for judgments about their
behavior and moral character. Across three preregistered studies (n=1060)
we found evidence that vividly imagining another’s situation as if it were
happening to oneself—similar to an actor embodying a role—moderates
moral judgments of a target other in morally ambiguous situations. In Study 1
(n = 160), participants randomly assigned to act out a role in a scene from a
play over Zoom (in pairs) rated their own character more favorably than
those randomly assigned to play the opposing character. Study 2 (n = 451)
replicated this effect, with participants evaluating the behavior and moral
character of the role they “played”—by reading their lines aloud as if
reflecting their own thoughts and feelings—more positively than those
playing the other character. Moreover, these less harsh judgments of the
target character were not found in a control group who simply read the scene
in silence. In Study 3 (n = 449), we identified a boundary condition: playing an
unambiguously immoral character did not produce the same effect,
although the effect failed to replicate using a scene from a different play."