THE GREEKS ADVANCE KORITZA FALL

THE GREEKS ADVANCE KORITZA FALL

On 28 October - the anniversary of Italy's humiliating defeat in the First World War at Caporetto – at three o'clock in the morning Metaxas was awakened at his modest villa in Kifissia near Athens: the Italian Minister Signor Grazzi was at the door asking to see the Prime Minister urgently. Metaxas put on his dressing-gown and went into the sitting-room where Grazzi handed him a note: it was an ultimatum from the Italian Government
demanding the right to occupy various unspecified strategic points in Greece for the duration of the war against Britain, and announcing that Italian forces would begin their advance into Greek territory

in three hours' time. Metaxas looked up from the note he was reading, and Grazzi recalled later that there were tears in the eyes of the short, plump little man who faced him.

‘The answer is no,' said Metaxas simply. “This is war.'
He courteously escorted his visitor to the door, then telephoned the King and told him what had happened. At five o'clock in the morning he was presiding at an emergency meeting of the Cabinet. Later that day the Greek General Staff issued its first War Communiqué:

"Since 5.30 this morning Italian military forces have been attacking our
advanced units on the Graeco-Albanian frontier. Our forces are defending
the national soil."

The day Greece entered the war King George assumed Supreme Command of all the Armed Forces. For him this was no mere constitutional formality: he brought to this role all the unswerving strength of purpose of which his character was capable and all the physical energy he could muster, presiding at day-to-day meetings of the War Council, conferring constantly with Metaxas and the Services chiefs, pressing Greece’s war requirements on the Allies and providing the spiritual and moral leadership which an embattled nation requires in moments of crisis.

In the first phase of the Graeco-Italian war the strategic aim of the Greek Army was to absorb the first shock of the Italian attack by falling back to carefully selected defensive positions in the mountain passes according to a pre-arranged plan; this delayed the Italian advance and gained precious time for full mobilization and deployment of the troops to the front.

On 14 November the Greek Army was able to launch a general offensive. The dramatic developments of the next few days are best summarized by Churchill himself:

“In the northern [Macedonian] sector the Greeks advanced into Albania, capturing Koritza on 22 November. In the central sector of northern Pindus an Italian Alpini division was annihilated. In the coastal zone, where the Italians had at first succeeded in making deep penetrations, they hastily retreated from the Kalamas river. The Greek Army, under General Papagos, showed superior skill in mountain warfare, outmaneuvring and outflanking their enemy. By the end of the year their prowess had forced the Italians thirty miles behind the Albanian frontier along the whole front. For several months twenty-seven Italian divisions were pinned in Albania by sixteen Greek divisions. The remarkable Greek resistance did much to hearten the other Balkan countries and Mussolini's prestige sank low.”

In North Africa the British also now took the initiative: in a series of wide outflanking sweeps their troops struck deep into Libya. On 9 December Sidi Barrani was recaptured, on 3 January 1941 Bardia fell, on 22 January Tobruk was taken. In six weeks the British Desert Army advanced two hundred miles across waterless desert capturing 133,000 prisoners and over seven hundred guns.