How HORRIFYING Was the PRR K4s Really?

Why Was The PRR K4s So DEADLY?

Subscribe: ‪@legendarylocomotives‬

The Pennsylvania Railroad K4s Pacific. Four hundred twenty-five built between 1914 and 1928. The backbone of Pennsy passenger service for over forty years. A legend in American railroading. But on February 6, 1951, K4s number 2445 entered a curve at Woodbridge, New Jersey, doing more than double the speed limit, and eighty-five people never made it home.
This is the story of how one of America's most famous steam locomotives became the center of the deadliest train wreck in New Jersey history. And it wasn't the locomotive's fault.
The K4s was designed in 1914 by Chief of Motive Power James Wallis. Eighty-inch drivers, two hundred five pounds of boiler pressure, capable of pulling ten passenger cars around Horseshoe Curve at speed. For the first two decades, they dominated PRR passenger operations. The Broadway Limited, the commuter trains, the mail expresses. The K4s handled it all.
But by the mid-1930s, the railroad had a problem. Passenger trains were getting longer and heavier, and the K4s couldn't keep up. One locomotive per train wasn't cutting it anymore. So the PRR started double-heading them. Two K4s, two complete crews, twice the operating costs. When that wasn't enough, they went to triple-heading. Meanwhile, competitors like the New York Central were running single Hudson locomotives that could do the same job. The PRR's solution? Keep running the obsolete Pacifics in multiple rather than invest in new, more powerful steam locomotives. They were focused on electrification and apparently decided they didn't need to upgrade their steam fleet.
Fast forward to February 6, 1951. The New Jersey Turnpike is under construction at Woodbridge. The PRR installs a temporary wooden trestle that goes into service at 1:01 PM that afternoon. Speed limit: twenty-five miles per hour. Normal speed through Woodbridge: sixty. Standard railroad practice for temporary speed restrictions? Install yellow warning signals so engineers know where to start slowing down. The PRR's decision? Signals were unnecessary. Too much trouble for temporary track. They posted a bulletin board notice back in January and called it good enough.
Train 733, "The Broker," leaves Exchange Place in Jersey City around 5 PM carrying over a thousand Wall Street commuters. It's overcrowded because the Jersey Central Railroad is on strike. Engineer Joseph Fitzsimmons, fifty-eight years old with thirty years of experience, is at the controls of K4s 2445. Conductor John Bishop reminds him about the Woodbridge speed restriction before departure. Fitzsimmons acknowledges it.
Forty minutes later, approaching Woodbridge at 5:40 PM, Fitzsimmons is looking for the warning signals that should tell him where to start braking. There are no signals. There are no markers. There's nothing. He's running fifty to sixty miles per hour looking for warnings that don't exist. By the time he realizes he's at the temporary bridge, it's too late. Bishop tries to reach the emergency brake cord but can't fight through the crush of standing passengers.
At 5:43 PM, two hundred thirty-four tons of steam locomotive hits that curve doing more than double the speed limit. The tracks weren't properly secured to the temporary trestle, just sitting in shallow grooves. Under the weight and speed, the rails shift. The gauge widens. 2445 goes over. Eight of eleven passenger cars derail. The first two tip onto their sides. Cars three and four jackknife into each other and plunge down a twenty-six-foot embankment. That's where most people were lost. Cars five and six end up hanging in mid-air over the street. Some passengers, seeing wet pavement below in the darkness, think it's water and jump.
Eighty-four people gone immediately. One more passes away in May. Five hundred injured. The deadliest train wreck in New Jersey history. The deadliest U.S. derailment since 1918.
Within days, Pennsylvania Railroad management is pointing fingers at Fitzsimmons. At a February 28 hearing, the railroad's assistant chief engineer testifies that excessive speed was the sole cause. But the Interstate Commerce Commission and Middlesex County prosecutors dig deeper. The PRR's own New York Division engineer testifies that the required braking distance was nearly double what supervisors had established. First Assistant Prosecutor Alex Eber concludes that while Fitzsimmons may have been speeding, the Pennsylvania Railroad was morally responsible for failing to install proper warning signals. He calls for the PRR to be indicted for manslaughter. The Public Utility Commission agrees.
But by the first anniversary, Eber drops the prosecution. His reasoning? A trial would punish taxpayers more than the railroad, which could afford endless legal battles. Civil lawsuits end up costing the PRR fifteen million dollars.