Oral Argument: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo

Oral argument audio (including transcript) of case
[22-451] Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
argued at the Supreme Court of the United States on Jan 17, 2024.

More information about the case:
Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loper_B...
Justia: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/fede... (including opinion)
Docket: https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.a...
Oyez.org: https://www.oyez.org/cases/2023/22-451

Video produced based on information and transcripts on oyez.org, licensed under a CC-BY-NC License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/....
Not affiliated with oyez.org or the Supreme Court.

Argued on Jan 17, 2024.
Petitioner: Loper Bright Enterprises, et al.
Respondent: Gina Raimondo, Secretary of Commerce, et al.
Advocates:
Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners)
Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Respondents)

Chapters
0:00:00 Paul D. Clement
0:40:28 Elizabeth B. Prelogar
1:12:59 Rebuttal: Paul D. Clement

Facts of the case (from oyez.org)
A group of commercial fishermen who regularly participate in the Atlantic herring fishery sued the National Marine Fisheries Service after the Service promulgated a rule that required industry to fund at-sea monitoring programs at an estimated cost of $710 per day. The fisherman argued that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 did not authorize the Service to create industry-funded monitoring requirements and that the Service failed to follow proper rulemaking procedure.

The district court granted summary judgment for the government based on its reasonable interpretation of its authority and its adoption of the rule through the required notice-and-comment procedure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed.

Question
1. Does the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorize the National Marine Fisheries Service to promulgate a rule that would require industry to pay for at-sea monitoring programs?

2. Should the Court overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council or at least clarify whether statutory silence on controversial powers creates an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency?