THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION- BASIC RULES ( PART 2)

THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-
(Meaning, Authority, and the Interpretive Task)


This lecture establishes the conceptual foundations of statutory interpretation. It explains what interpretation is, why it is unavoidable, and the constitutional assumptions that govern the judicial task before any interpretive rule is applied. If this foundational stage is misunderstood, every subsequent rule—the literal, golden, mischief, and purposive approaches—will be misapplied.

The central proposition is that interpretation is inherent in the application of law. The claim that courts merely “apply” clear statutory language without interpretation is doctrinally indefensible. As Chief Justice Marshall stated in Marbury v Madison (1803) 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, those who apply legal rules must “of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” A statute cannot be applied to facts unless its meaning has first been determined. Modern theory confirms this. Scalia and Garner explain in Reading Law (2012) that even where meaning appears obvious, that appearance is itself the product of an interpretive judgment already made. Interpretation is therefore not optional or discretionary; it is a logical precondition to application.

Closely connected is the myth of the “clear text.” Words do not carry meaning in isolation. Meaning emerges from context, legal usage, institutional setting, and statutory purpose. Even apparently straightforward provisions require courts to determine which ordinary meaning applies, whether a technical meaning was intended, how the provision fits within the statute as a whole, and how it interacts with other enactments. Apparent clarity is not the absence of interpretation; it is its outcome.

A second discipline is that interpretation is not policy-making. The judicial task is to ascertain what the legislature has enacted, not what judges believe it ought to have enacted. Scalia and Garner describe this as the Supremacy-of-Text Principle: purpose may illuminate meaning, but it cannot override the enacted words. This discipline is essential to democratic legitimacy and constitutional restraint.

The lecture then clarifies the concepts of statute, enactment, and legislation in Ghanaian law. Article 295 of the 1992 Constitution and section 1 of the Interpretation Act, 2009 (Act 792) define “enactment” broadly to include Acts of Parliament, constitutional instruments, statutory instruments, decrees, laws, and any provision thereof. A statute in the strict sense refers to primary legislation; an enactment includes both primary and subordinate legislation; and legislation is the widest term, encompassing all law made under legislative authority. These distinctions are substantive, not semantic, because they affect interpretive presumptions, questions of validity, and the scope of judicial review.

Statute law is also distinct from customary law. As explained by Janet Daniels and Bimpong-Buta, statutes are positive law deliberately enacted under constitutional authority, whereas customary law derives validity from usage, acceptance, and judicial recognition. The interpretive consequence is that statutes are approached primarily through textual, structural, and constitutional analysis, while customary law often requires proof of content before interpretation can even begin.

The authority to interpret legislation rests with the courts, not because of judicial superiority, but because constitutional governance requires an impartial body to resolve disputes over meaning. This authority operates within the separation of powers. Courts exceed constitutional limits when they add provisions, remove deliberate restrictions, or substitute policy preferences for statutory text. Courts may resolve ambiguity and reconcile inconsistencies, but they may not correct perceived legislative omissions. Silence may be intentional, and omissions are for Parliament, not the courts, to address.

Finally, the lecture identifies foundational presumptions governing interpretation: legislative supremacy subject to the Constitution; coherence and rationality in statutory design; and the presumption that statutes are deliberate legal instruments employing intentional language.

The core lesson is therefore clear. Interpretation is unavoidable. Authority flows from text, not preference. Judicial power is constitutionally limited. Only when these foundations are understood can interpretive rules be applied responsibly.

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