Prof. Bockhover on Self and Social Roles as Chimeras Revisited

A traditionally Western view of personhood holds that the “core self” consists of rational autonomy, endowing us with an independent personal existence and a moral framework for action as self-sufficient, rational individuals. In marked contrast, drawing on the Analects of Confucius, Henry Rosemont defines personhood in terms of social roles and their correlative responsibilities. On this view, we are persons only relationally—by virtue of the roles that interdependently connect us to one another. Rosemont contends that the notion of an independent self is a chimera that produces a problematic ethic, one that undermines our connection to others rather than recognizing it as central to who we are and how we ought to treat one another.

I argue, however, that social roles are also chimeras: they are constructed rather than metaphysically given. While we are essentially social beings, the ways in which this sociality unfolds are variable and contingent. I also maintain that we are essentially self-aware subjects—embodied selves whose experience is uniquely our own yet inevitably permeated by otherness. Both the individualizing and the social dimensions of selfhood are necessary and interdependent; privileging one over the other brings both benefits and risks.