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Double Auction with Interdependent Values
Автор: Becker Friedman Institute University of Chicago
Загружено: 2014-08-07
Просмотров: 7242
Описание:
Fuhito Kojima proposes a new double auction mechanism to address incompatible incentives that sometimes lead to inefficient outcomes. Their mechanism - the "groupwise price mechanism" - satisfies both approximate efficiency and incentive compatibility.
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