Luxair Flight 9642 Aftermath Footage | 6 November 2002 Niederanven, Luxembourg

Accident Description:
https://www.instagram.com/p/CknOmLrvh...

Photos Archive:
https://x.com/aircrashdaily/status/15...

𝗟𝘂𝘅𝗮𝗶𝗿 𝗙𝗹𝗶𝗴𝗵𝘁 𝟵𝟲𝟰𝟮 was a scheduled international passenger flight from Berlin to Luxembourg, operated by a Fokker 50 (Reg. LX-LGB) on 𝗡𝗼𝘃𝗲𝗺𝗯𝗲𝗿 𝟲, 𝟮𝟬𝟬𝟮.

The plane departed Berlin at 08:40. At 10:01 Luxembourg Approach cleared the flight for a runway 24 approach: "Luxair 9642 turn right heading 220 to intercept. Cleared for approach, report established on the localizer." After passing the localizer the crew contacted Luxembourg Tower and reported being established on a runway 24 ILS approach. The tower controller then passed on the runway visual range (RVR) information, which was 250 meters. The crew reported that they needed 300 metres for the approach, to which the controller replied : "9642 copied, uh, so continue approach I keep you advised. We didn't have 300, uh, during the last, uh, time." The approach was continued, but at 10:04:46 the captain decided to discontinue the approach.

Eleven seconds later the tower controller reported the RVR to be 300 metres. Immediately engine power was reduced to idle and the co-pilot radioed: "9642 roger so we continue". The tower then cleared the flight to land. The gear and flaps were lowered and at 10:05:17 the left prop blade angle changed from 'normal' to 'low pitch', causing the pilot to say: "Wat ass dat" (What's that??).  Almost immediately the right prop blade angle also went into low pitch. The flaps were raised several sounds and exclamations were recorded by the CVR the decrease in propeller revolutions and GPWS warnings. Both engines then failed as the plane descended. The plane collided with terrain and caught fire. Only 2 of the 22 occupants survived the crash.

𝗖𝗮𝘂𝘀𝗲𝘀:
"The initial cause of the accident was the acceptance by the crew of the approach clearance although they were not prepared to it, namely the absence of preparation of a go-around. It led the crew to perform a series of improvised actions that ended in the prohibited override of the primary stop on the power levers.
Contributory factors can be listed as follows:
1. A lack of preparation for the landing, initiated by unnecessary occupations resulting from an obtained RVR value, which was below their company approved minima, created a disorganisation in the cockpit, leading to uncoordinated actions by each crewmember.
2. All applicable procedures as laid down in the operations manual were violated at some stage of the approach. All this did not directly cause the accident, but created an environment whereby privately designed actions were initiated to make a landing possible.
3. Routine and the will to arrive at its destination may have put the crew in a psychological state of mind, which could be the origin of the deviations from standard procedures as noticed.
4. The low reliability of the installed secondary stop safety device that was favoured by the non-application of service bulletin ABSC SB F050-32-4. Also the mode of distribution of the safety information (Fokker Aircraft B.V. - Service letter137) to the operator as well as the operator s internal distribution to the crews, that did not guarantee that the crews were aware of the potential loss of secondary stop on propeller pitch control.
5. The lack of harmony resulting from the use of various training centres and non-standardised programs that might have impaired the synergy of the crew."